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THE EQUAL PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS OF
GOVERNMENT’S HATEFUL SPEECH
HELEN NORTON* 
ABSTRACT
Under what circumstances should we understand government’s
racist or otherwise hateful speech to violate the Equal Protection
Clause? Government speech that communicates hostility or animus
on the basis of race, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, or
other class status can facilitate private parties’ discriminatory
behavior, deter its targets from certain important opportunities or
activities, and communicate a message of exclusion and second-class
status. Contemporary equal protection doctrine, however, does not
yet fully address the harms that such government expression poten-
tially poses. The recent emergence of the Court’s government speech
doctrine—which to date has emphasized the value of government
expression without yet fully addressing its potential costs—offers an
important new opportunity to consider the situations in which
government speech might offend equal protection values. 
This Article offers a framework for assessing the equal protection
implications of government speech that expresses hatred on the basis
of class status. To this end, it first identifies the ways in which such
speech might inflict a range of discriminatory behavioral and ex-
pressive harms. The Article then describes lower courts’ general
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failure to address these potential harms when considering equal
protection challenges to such government expression, and contrasts
courts’ more expansive understanding of the constitutionally salient
harms potentially posed by government’s religious speech in the
Establishment Clause context. 
Drawing from the Establishment Clause experience, the Article
then proposes two alternatives for determining when government’s
hateful speech runs afoul of equal protection values. First, under a
behavioral harm approach, we might understand the Equal
Protection Clause to prohibit hateful government expression when it
would facilitate private parties’ discrimination or cause class mem-
bers to alter their behavior—for example, by discouraging class
members from pursuing a government job or petitioning the legis-
lature because they reasonably conclude that such efforts would be
pointless or unwise. Second, under an expressive meaning analysis,
we might understand the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit gov-
ernment speech that communicates that class members are outsiders
or second-class citizens. After addressing possible objections, the
Article concludes that both approaches more accurately recognize
those situations in which government speech may inflict harms
repugnant to equal protection values than does the status quo, which
largely ignores or dismisses those harms. 
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INTRODUCTION
Although government has engaged in speech since its inception,1
the Supreme Court has only just begun to consider whether and
how the Constitution limits the government’s expressive choices.2
In its “recently minted”3 government speech doctrine, the Court has
held that the Free Speech Clause does not constrain the govern-
ment’s expression, interpreting the First Amendment to include a
“government speech” defense to free speech claims by private par-
ties who seek to alter or enjoin a state actor’s delivery of its own
views.4 The Establishment Clause context is the only other area in
1. See 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1947)
(“Now it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even listen.”); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970) (“Participation by the
government in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature of any democratic
society. It enables the government to inform, explain, and persuade—measures especially
crucial in a society that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government
participation also greatly enriches the system; it provides the facts, ideas, and expertise not
available from other sources.”). See generally JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND
110-15 (1977) (documenting longstanding examples of government speech); MARK G. YUDOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 5-19 (1983) (detailing the means and methods of government
communication). Indeed, government must speak if it is to govern effectively. 
2. For a brief history of the Court’s government speech doctrine, see Helen Norton &
Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 904-07 (2010).
3. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 467 (majority opinion) (“If [public entities] were engaging in their own
expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech Clause
restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”);
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (explaining that the government’s
own speech is “exempt” from Free Speech Clause scrutiny). Resting on the premise that
government speech is of great value to the public, the Court’s government speech doctrine
permits the government to prevent other speakers from changing, joining, or otherwise
garbling the government’s own message. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467-68 (“A government entity
has the right to ‘speak for itself.’... Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could
function if it lacked this freedom.” (citations omitted)).
A number of scholars have proposed an array of Free Speech Clause limits to the
government speech defense, as yet to no avail. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech:
When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 671-91 (2008); Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 35, 55-88 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government
Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1015-31 (2005); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government
Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 597-618 (2008). Nelson Tebbe
seeks more broadly to identify an overarching set of constitutional limits on government
speech. Nelson Tebbe, Government Endorsement and Disparagement (Brooklyn Law Sch.,
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which the Supreme Court has to date wrestled with the constitu-
tional implications of government expression.5 Whether and when
the government’s racist or otherwise hateful speech—that is, its
speech that intentionally communicates hatred, hostility, or animus
on the basis of class status6—violates the Equal Protection Clause
thus remains unclear under the Court’s current doctrine.
More specifically, government speech that communicates hatred,
hostility, or animus on the basis of race, gender, national origin,
sexual orientation, or other class status can facilitate private
parties’ discriminatory behavior, deter its targets from certain
important opportunities or activities, and communicate a message
of exclusion and outsider status.7 These disturbing possibilities
Working Paper No. 287, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2125243. While this Article focuses specifically on the Equal Protection Clause as a
possible source of constitutional constraint on government’s hateful speech, note that
Professor Tebbe seeks to identify a broader limiting principle that he calls “government
nonendorsement,” locating it in a variety of constitutional sources. Id. at 5.
5. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. Indeed, courts and commentators had considered
Establishment Clause limits on what we now understand as government expression long
before the Court had developed a vocabulary—much less a doctrine—for addressing
government speech. See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion:
Establishment Clause Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24 (2010) (“[A]
large proportion of all Establishment Clause jurisprudence could be thought of as involving
claims about government religious speech, with the other broad category relating to
government aid.”).
6. By emphasizing “class status,” rather than “protected class status,” this Article does
not limit its focus to those government classifications that trigger heightened scrutiny under
the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine, which is especially suspicious of government
actions that target individuals based on race, national origin, gender, and a few other
characteristics. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (gender); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (race). Indeed, the Court has also made clear that
government action motivated by class-based animus may violate the Equal Protection Clause
even under rational basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)
(striking down a governmental classification on the basis of sexual orientation as
“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”).
7. See infra Part II. Note that the term “government speech” here refers to the collective
speech of a government agency or body, such as a resolution, proclamation, or report, or the
speech of an individual empowered to speak for such a body. See Helen Norton, Campaign
Speech Law with a Twist: When Government Is the Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY
L.J. 209, 213-14 (2011) [hereinafter Norton, Campaign Speech Law] (distinguishing
government speech that reflects the position of government institutions from speech by
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require us to consider the constitutional implications of govern-
ment’s hateful speech. For example, should we understand the
Equal Protection Clause to bar a government’s decision to adopt
and display the motto “White Supremacy Forever” on the state seal
or a state license plate?8 What if a governor or a president were to
issue a proclamation or a legislature were to pass a resolution de-
claring that members of the Latino, Arab, or gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgender (GLBT) communities are not worthy of respect?9
Many would consider such governmental messages to be offensive
to equal protection values.10 Yet the small number of decisions in
this area—that, to be sure, largely predate the Supreme Court’s
developing government speech doctrine—do not necessarily confirm
that intuition. Because government’s hateful speech unaccompanied
individuals who happen to hold office but who retain their Free Speech Clause rights to
express their own views). Such “government speech” does not include “speech by individual
government officials expressing their own views in a personal, nongovernmental
capacity—e.g., when a governor endorses a particular candidate for Senate on her own time
and without any expenditure of government resources.” Id. at 214. For a discussion of the
circumstances under which such individuals’ speech might be regulated because they are
perceived to be speaking for the government, see Helen Norton, Constraining Public
Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression,
59 DUKE L.J. 1, 47-64 (2009) [hereinafter Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech].
8. For parallel examples from the Establishment Clause context, see infra notes 83-95
and accompanying text; see also I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 156 (2004)
(“[I]magine the message that would be communicated by a state or local authority displaying,
in addition to the American flag, a flag depicting a Swastika.”).
9. See Farley v. Healey, 431 P.2d 650, 657 (Cal. 1967) (listing hypothetical examples of
municipal government resolutions communicating troubling messages, such as those
endorsing the view “[t]hat schools be segregated”); see also Kelly Sarabyn, Racial and Sexual
Paternalism, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 553, 559 (2009) (posing a hypothetical in which
Congress established a policy of donning Ku Klux Klan robes and hoods when engaging in
official business to express its commitment to racial hierarchy). 
10. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Education,
Contraceptive Access, and Work-Family Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 941, 957-58 (2007) (“Under the
race cases, government can no more proclaim white supremacy than it can act on racist
views to deny concrete opportunities.”); Sarabyn, supra note 9, at 559 (stating that a
governmental policy of donning Klan robes for official business “appears to violate the
command of equal protection”).
Constitutional provisions other than the Equal Protection Clause may also be in play. See,
e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment
Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 543 (2002) (“[G]lorifying Confederate symbols on official
state property should be prohibited pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution [which] prohibits all relics of servitude, including state sponsored displays
meant to laud a breakaway republic which idealized and waged war to perpetuate black
slavery.”).
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by the traditional exercise of state power does not directly distrib-
ute or deny tangible benefits on the basis of class status, such ex-
pression raises the difficult question of whether and when such
speech should be understood to deny class members the equal
protection of the laws.11
Our historical and continuing experience suggests that the pos-
sibility of government’s hateful speech is more than theoretical. As
just one of many examples, recall President Andrew Johnson’s 1867
annual message to Congress, in which he characterized blacks as
possessing less “capacity for government than any other race of
people” and stated that “[n]o independent government of any form
had ever been successful in their hands. On the contrary, wherever
they have been left to their own devices they had shown a constant
tendency to relapse into barbarism.”12 Along the same lines, a
report by a Reconstruction-era, Florida state commission “praised
slavery as a ‘benign’ institution deficient only in its inadequate
regulation of black sexual behavior.”13 
Such matters have generated contemporary controversies as well.
For example, a number of state and local governments flew the
Confederate flag or incorporated it into their state symbols in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education and other efforts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
with respect to segregation.14 Some, such as Caddo Parish, Louisi-
ana, still do.15 Such a choice is, and is intended to be, expressive of
the government’s views, although the exact nature of those views
11. See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (describing cases in which lower courts
have been reluctant to find that plaintiffs challenging allegedly hateful government speech
have established that the speech imposed sufficiently discriminatory effects to violate the
Equal Protection Clause). 
12. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 180 (1988). Professor Foner characterized this as
“probably the most blatantly racist pronouncement ever to appear in an official state paper
of an American President.” Id. 
13. Id. at 200. More recently, the State of Mississippi established the Mississippi State
Sovereignty Committee in the 1960s as a state agency dedicated to defending white
supremacy through speech and other actions. TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN
THE KING YEARS 1963-65, at 240-41 (1998).
14. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
15. See Cecelia Trenticosta & William C. Collins, Death and Dixie: How the Courthouse
Confederate Flag Influences Capital Cases in Louisiana, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC
JUST. 125, 125, 127-37 (2011) (describing the history underlying the Confederate flag’s
placement in Caddo Parish).
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remains the subject of vigorous controversy.16 To be sure, whether
the government’s speech actually expresses animus on the basis of
class status—that is, whether it actually communicates such hatred
or hostility—is often deeply contested.17 But such contests have
largely obscured the theoretical question I seek to examine here:
whether concededly hateful or otherwise facially discriminatory
government speech18 that is unaccompanied by the government’s
traditional exercise of its coercive power violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
The hypotheticals and examples offered above are extreme and
perhaps—one fervently hopes—increasingly unlikely at this point
in our history. I offer them, however, so that for purposes of this
Article we can focus simply on the threshold question of whether
government speech, by itself, should ever be understood to violate
the Equal Protection Clause. This Article seeks to provide a frame-
work for assessing the equal protection implications of such
expression. To this end, Part I starts by reviewing contemporary
courts’ and commentators’ competing approaches to assessing equal
protection problems, explaining that the challenges posed by gov-
ernment’s hateful speech encourage us to explore whether and how
we might reconsider the sorts of harmful effects of government
classifications that should be understood to violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Part II turns to an examination of the ways in
which government speech that expresses hatred, hostility, or
animus on the basis of class status might inflict a range of discrimi-
natory behavioral and expressive harms: it may facilitate discrimi-
nation by private parties, deter its targets from engaging in certain
16. See infra note 76.
17. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
18. In this paper, I sometimes use the phrases “government’s hateful speech” or
“discriminatory government speech” as shorthand for government speech that expresses
hatred, hostility, or animus based on class status. Note that here I do not revisit the
Supreme Court’s holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit government’s
facially neutral action that imposes discriminatory effects on protected class members absent
a showing of discriminatory government purpose. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239 (1976). Instead, I am examining the possibility that, under certain conditions, the
Equal Protection Clause should be understood to prohibit government’s facially
discriminatory expression—in other words, government speech that intentionally expresses
animus on the basis of class status that is otherwise unaccompanied by the government’s
traditional exercise of its coercive power.
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important opportunities or activities, and send a message of
inferiority and second-class status. Part III describes lower courts’
failure to address these harms when considering equal protection
challenges to such government expression, and then contrasts
courts’ more expansive understanding of the constitutionally salient
harms of government speech in the Establishment Clause
context—the only area other than the Free Speech Clause in which
the Supreme Court to date has wrestled with the constitutional
implications of government expression. 
Part IV draws from the Establishment Clause experience to
propose two alternatives for determining whether and when govern-
ment’s hateful speech runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.
First, under a behavioral harm approach, we might understand the
Equal Protection Clause to prohibit such government expression
when it would facilitate private parties’ discrimination or cause its
targets to alter their behavior—for example, by discouraging class
members from pursuing a government job or petitioning the legis-
lature because they reasonably conclude that such efforts would be
pointless or unwise. Second, under an expressive meaning analysis,
we might understand the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit
government speech that communicates that class members are out-
siders or second-class citizens. After addressing possible objections,
the Article concludes that both analyses more accurately recognize
those situations in which government speech may inflict harms
repugnant to equal protection values than does the status quo,
which largely ignores or dismisses those harms. 
I. COMPETING VIEWS OF EQUALITY AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Government’s hateful speech raises challenging equal protection
questions because it does not involve the traditional exercise of
state power. Indeed, a number of scholars focus on what they char-
acterize as the presence or absence of the government’s coercion to
distinguish between what they call “hard” and “soft” law.19 As an
19. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012)
(“Hard power is, quite simply, ‘the ability to coerce.’... Soft power, by contrast, is ‘the ability
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.’”(quoting Joseph
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example of “hard law,” consider government-imposed segregation
or differential punishment of individuals based on race, gender, or
other protected class status, which generally violate the Equal
Protection Clause except in those rare situations in which the
government’s action survives the rigorous demands of heightened
scrutiny.20 To be sure, such “hard law” is often deeply expressive as
well. As just one of many examples, laws banning interracial
marriage expressed the state’s point of view with respect to racial
hierarchy by asserting the state’s coercive power to require or
punish certain behavior based on the participant’s race.21 
In contrast, some commentators use the term “soft law” to de-
scribe government efforts to persuade rather than to coerce.22
Government speech is thus a prominent illustration of “soft law”:
examples include a congressional resolution that communicates the
views of one or both chambers of Congress, or a municipality’s
S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 256 (2004))); Jacob
E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV.
573, 577 (2008) (defining “soft law” to include statements by lawmaking authorities that do
not have legally coercive status—that is, those statements “that do not have the force of
law”). To be sure, however, a number of thoughtful commentators contest such distinctions
as meaningless, instead urging that all government action is coercive. See, e.g., Robert Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471-74
(1923) (arguing that because private actors can assert coercive power just as government can,
government’s choice to leave certain matters to background law rather than to public
regulation simply creates opportunities for coercion by private actors; government, thus,
always distributes coercion in different ways rather than coercing or refraining from
coercion).
20. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
21. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications
must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”).
For other examples, see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 240-41, 266-67 (1971) (White,
J., dissenting) (characterizing the city’s decision to close its public swimming pools rather
than comply with a court order to desegregate them as “an expression of official policy that
Negroes are unfit to associate with whites” and that “[c]losing the pools without a colorable
nondiscriminatory reason was every bit as much an official endorsement of the notion that
Negroes are not equal to whites” as official segregation); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (“[T]he social meaning
of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a position of walled-off inferiority.”).
22. Along these lines, as Gersen and Posner observe, “Sometimes, but not always, soft
law will produce the same behavioral effects that an otherwise equivalent hard law would
have produced.” Gersen & Posner, supra note 19, at 579. 
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proclamation of its views on matters over which it has no legal
control.23
Whether and when the Equal Protection Clause might constrain
government speech thus requires us to wrestle anew with what it
means for the government to deny “the equal protection of the
laws,”24 and whether the government’s expression, or other forms
of “soft law,” can ever do so when otherwise unaccompanied by the
traditional exercise of its coercive power. As explained below, the
answer to this question may turn on whether one takes an antisub-
ordination or an anticlassification view of equal protection values,25
as well as whether one is willing to reconsider the sorts of harmful
effects of government classifications that should be understood to
violate the Equal Protection Clause.26
I have argued elsewhere that even objectionable or otherwise
unwise government speech can further, rather than frustrate, Free
Speech Clause values—so long as the expression’s governmental
source is transparent—because such speech exposes the govern-
ment’s priorities to the electorate and thus enhances opportunities
for meaningful political accountability.27 To be sure, a government’s
hateful speech reveals a great deal about that government that may
valuably shape the public’s decisions about its government. That
the government’s discriminatory speech may be consistent with free
speech values,28 however, does not mean that it is necessarily con-
sistent with equal protection values. Indeed, the two clauses have
very different underlying purposes. 
The primary purposes of the Free Speech Clause include facil-
itating participation in democratic self-governance and contributing
to the available marketplace of ideas—political and otherwise.29
23. See, e.g., Farley v. Healey, 431 P.2d 650, 651 (Cal. 1967) (assessing a proposed ballot
initiative that would express the City and County of San Francisco’s interest in “urging an
immediate cease-fire and American withdrawal from Vietnam”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
25. See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part II.
27. Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech, supra note 7, at 20-30.
28. For arguments that the government’s hateful speech might also violate the Free
Speech Clause under certain circumstances, see infra note 117.
29. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980). Other values often located at the heart of the First
Amendment include enhancing individual autonomy and self-fulfillment. Id. Unlike private
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Even noxious government speech generally furthers those purposes
by revealing the government’s preferences to the electorate and by
adding to the ongoing public discourse.30 But although political
accountability measures like lobbying and voting are generally
identified as the appropriate remedies from a free speech perspec-
tive for those unhappy with their government’s views,31 such
measures are less likely to offer meaningful recourse for govern-
ment speech that targets politically vulnerable groups.32 Indeed,
government is most likely to engage in hateful speech when such
expression is politically popular with much of its constituency.33
Hateful government expression thus often targets unpopular minor-
ities in situations when ordinary political accountability measures
provide no meaningful remedy, thus increasing the importance of
identifying some means of constitutional redress.34 
In contrast, the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, al-
though themselves contested, are very different from those of the
Free Speech Clause. Courts, policymakers, and scholars have long
debated whether equality law should be understood as driven by
speakers, however, the government has no autonomy interests that the First Amendment
protects. See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
1637, 1662 (2006).
30. See Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech, supra note 7, at 21-22.
31. See Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State
Holidays, and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1079, 1110 (1995) (“That courts ought not strike down some practice does not in the
least suggest that the practice is in fact commendable and ought not be changed, voluntarily,
by decent people.”).
32. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87 (1980) (advocating
a “representation-reinforcing” view of constitutional rights that emphasizes judicial review
as a means of protection for minorities who are unable to protect themselves from majorities
through political means).
33. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (“Government officials are
expected as a part of the democratic process to represent and to espouse the views of a
majority of their constituents.”).
34. See Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Putting Down: Expressive Subordination and Equal
Protection, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 112, 115 (2012), available at http://www.
uclalawreview.org/?p=3098 (“[R]acially expressive subordination is not well regulated by
majoritarian democracy, as its victims tend to have insufficient voting strength to overturn
popularly sanctioned policies.”).
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antisubordination or anticlassification values. Antisubordination
advocates, on one hand, urge that the Equal Protection Clause
should be interpreted to bar those government actions that have the
intent or the effect of perpetuating traditional patterns of hierar-
chy, but not those—including those expressly based on race or other
class status—that seek to undermine such hierarchies.35 Reva
Siegel, for example, explains the antisubordination principle as “the
conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that
enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups.”36
An antisubordination perspective thus finds “no moral or constitu-
tional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate
a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordina-
tion.”37 Hateful government speech that reinforces traditional
patterns of hierarchy by communicating a message of exclusion or
inferiority based on class status thus offends an antisubordination
view of the Equal Protection Clause. 
On the other hand, assessing the constitutional implications of
hateful government speech may be considerably more challenging
35. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
147-56 (1976) (urging a “group-disadvantaging” interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
that attends to racial groups’ varying experience of disadvantage in American life); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2455 (1994) (advocating an
“anticaste” understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that “forbids social and legal
practices from turning highly visible but morally irrelevant differences into a basis for
second-class citizenship”).
36. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004); see also
Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community, 114
YALE L.J. 1353, 1382 (2005) (“[The Equal Protection Clause] creates a new substantive value
of ‘nonslavery’ and antisubordination to replace the old values of slavery and white
supremacy.”). 
37. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 864 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Equal Protection Clause, ratified following the Civil War, has
always distinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby subordinates
racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people of all races.”); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Actions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to
hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated.”);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551-52 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“A profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and
governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral
governmental activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism.”).
172 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:159
for those who urge an anticlassification understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause, especially for those who emphasize a distinction
between “hard” and “soft” law when defining constitutionally cog-
nizable “classifications.” Anticlassification adherents have long
described their views as driven not only by instrumental concerns
that race-based classifications stigmatize beneficiaries and exac-
erbate racial divisions,38 but also by the moral commands of color
blindness.39 Anticlassification theorists thus take the view that the
Constitution prohibits government from “reduc[ing] ... an individual
to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment”—regard-
less of whether the government seeks to perpetuate or instead
undermine longstanding racial hierarchies.40 
As Andrew Carlon has observed, an increasingly anticlassifica-
tion Court is most suspicious of “classification[s] with effect[s],” or
in other words, “individual racial classifications with immediate
effect on the persons classified.”41 The easiest cases for anticlas-
sification advocates thus involve those actions with the most
38. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 759-60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (maintaining that
government’s race-based classification is “precisely the sort of government action that pits
the races against one another, exacerbates racial tension, and ‘provoke[s] resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race’” (quoting
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)));
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (describing the government’s race-based
classifications as “divisive” and as creating “antagonisms” (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52, 66-67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting))). 
39. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also
because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”); see also Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a
forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by
ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at
224 (majority opinion) (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”); id. at 239 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[U]nder our Constitution there can be
no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s
focus upon the individual, and its rejection of dispositions based on race, or based on blood.”
(citations omitted)). 
40. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
41. Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1159, 1199. 
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immediate and obvious effects—that is, “hard law” in which “the
government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individ-
ual racial classifications.”42 But government speech, by itself, does
not distribute such burdens or benefits, at least not in traditional
ways. Whether government speech or other forms of “soft law” that
intentionally express animus on the basis of class status offend
anticlassification theorists thus depends on such theorists’ willing-
ness to reconsider the sorts of classifications that are repugnant to
equal protection values.43 
Another way of thinking about the government speech problem
in this context is thus whether we need to rethink the sort of
“effects”44 or “harms” of classifications that we understand as
violating the Equal Protection Clause and whether they include
42. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion). Andrew Carlon also describes
these as “racial adjudications”—in other words, the product of “a particularized proceeding
that seeks to identify, as one of its determinative elements, the race of the person whose
rights or liabilities are being adjudicated” and that has “immediate effect on the persons
classified.” Carlon, supra note 41, at 1159, 1199. In contrast, as Professor Carlon notes, the
Court has generally refused to consider “classifications without immediate effect,” such as
tracking racial demographics for census purposes, as suspicious for equal protection
purposes. Id. at 1158-59; see also Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn
Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 240 (2010)
(“[T]he Court’s comfort with—or suspicion of—race-conscious actions sometimes turns on the
government’s underlying ends [or purpose] and sometimes on the degree to which the
individual effects of its racially motivated means can be characterized as concrete or
diffuse.”).
43. Michael Dorf has recently suggested greater optimism that anticlassification theorists
would consider government’s hateful speech to be unconstitutional. See Michael C. Dorf,
Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV.
1267, 1346 (2011) (“There is ... a cross-ideological consensus that at least some sorts of
government acts, symbols, and statements run afoul of a principle barring the government
from labeling persons or their relationships as second-class, although the consensus breaks
down over the scope of that principle.”). Although I admire much in Professor Dorf ’s
article—and I share his normative view that such examples should be understood to violate
the Constitution—I do not share his descriptive confidence that contemporary anticlas-
sification advocates necessarily agree that such examples are constitutionally impermissible
under current equal protection doctrine. This Article is in part prompted by my concerns in
this regard.
44. Recall, for example, the Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis, in which it held that
government actions that imposed a discriminatory impact on the basis of protected class
status did not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless accompanied by the government’s
discriminatory intent. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Focusing on expressive situations in which
government’s discriminatory intent is uncontested, this Article explores the circumstances
under which we should understand the government’s speech to be imposing a discriminatory
impact as well.
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those government messages that intentionally “classify” individuals
as worthy or not worthy of respect based on such status.45 To aid
this inquiry, the next Part identifies and examines the potential
harms of government’s hateful speech.
II. THE POTENTIAL HARMS OF GOVERNMENT’S HATEFUL SPEECH
This Part identifies a range of behavioral and expressive harms
potentially caused by government speech that communicates
hatred, hostility, or animus on the basis of class status.46 As
45. For another example of a governmental classification that may or may not impose the
sorts of effects sufficient to sustain an equal protection violation under anticlassification
theory, recall some states’ longstanding retention of unenforceable laws criminalizing
interracial marriage or same-sex sexual conduct. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361(A)
(2005) (prohibiting sodomy). Of course, the state code that declares that people of different
races shall not marry, or that people of the same sex shall not engage in consensual sexual
activity, no longer carries legal effect after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
Nonetheless, South Carolina and Alabama took more than three decades to repeal their long-
unenforceable antimiscegenation statutes. See, e.g., Interracial Marriage Ban Up for Vote in
Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1999, at A21. Texas and Kansas have yet to repeal the sorts
of statutes struck down in Lawrence under the Due Process Clause. A.G. Sulzberger, Kansas
Law on Sodomy Stays on Books Despite a Cull, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at A13 (reporting
that Kansas Governor Sam Brownback had declined to include the state’s anti-sodomy
statute in his recommendation that the legislature repeal dozens of “out-of-date, unrea-
sonable and burdensome state laws”); Ben Wermund, Bills Would Take Texas’ Illegal Sodomy
Ban off Books, STATESMAN (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.statesman.com/news/texas-
politics/bills-would-take-texas-illegal-sodomy-ban-off-1349429.html (describing to date unsuc-
cessful efforts to remove now-unenforceable laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct from
Texas lawbooks). All of these statutes classify on the basis of race or sexual orientation in
ways that are generally thought to violate the Equal Protection Clause—except that here,
those classifications no longer have the force of law. Instead, the government’s now-
inaccurate characterization of protected class members’ behavior as illegal may well operate
as a type of soft, or persuasive, law that deters such behavior, or encourages others to
discriminate against protected class members who engage in that behavior. See Sulzberger,
supra (quoting gay rights advocate that the failure to repeal such laws has “a stigmatizing
effect on same-sex relationships and can sometimes be wrongly cited by law enforcement
officers unaware that they are no longer enforceable”).
46. Courts, advocates, and commentators continue to wrestle with the constitutional
salience of expressive harm in contexts other than those involving pure government speech.
Consider, for example, state laws that refuse to permit same-sex “marriage,” but that
nevertheless provide all of the legal benefits of marriage through separate civil unions or
other measures. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[California law
amending the state constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry] serves
no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays and
lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify their relationships and families as inferior
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discussed below, such government speech can classify its targets in
ways that may offend at least some anticlassification theorists, and
can communicate a subordinating message repugnant to most
antisubordination theorists.
A. Behavioral Harms 
Under some circumstances, government’s racist, homophobic, or
similarly hateful speech may sufficiently command or otherwise
coerce its listeners’ behavior in ways that impose the sorts of
concrete effects that most anticlassification theorists would agree
fall within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause.47 
Recall, for example, Lombard v. Louisiana, in which the Supreme
Court held that city officials’ speech commanding continued segre-
gation by private restaurants was sufficiently coercive to constitute
state action in violation of the Constitution: 
As we interpret the New Orleans city officials’ statements, they
here determined that the city would not permit Negroes to seek
desegregated service in restaurants. Consequently, the city
to those of opposite-sex couples.”); Courtney Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to Be Named:
Moving Beyond Race to Explain Why ‘Separate’ Nomenclature for Gay and Straight
Relationships Will Never Be ‘Equal,’ 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1163 (2009) (“The name issue, in a
nutshell, is this: Is it constitutionally permissible to give same-sex couples all the benefits
and responsibilities of marriage ... but to officially call that status by another name?”); Dorf,
supra note 43, at 1343-45. Regardless of whether one characterizes such laws as “hard” or
“soft,” behavioral and expressive harm analysis might helpfully apply to such government
action as well.
Caroline Mala Corbin similarly focuses on the potential harms that government’s religious
speech that violates the Establishment Clause may pose to nonbelievers. Caroline Mala
Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 347, 375-78 (2012). For a
discussion of the relevance of harm when analyzing government regulation of potentially
harmful speech by private, non-governmental parties for First Amendment purposes, see
generally Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81
(2011).
47. Cf. Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1195, 1218 (2008) (“Coercion is normally claimed when one has been forced by
another to act, or refrain from acting, against their will. Coercive pressure can overcome
one’s will and make a particular course of action unreasonably costly. For example, where
coercive pressure is applied to Bob, that pressure would render one or more of his options
unreasonably costly. Coercive pressure in this respect makes a particular option
unreasonable but not necessarily impossible. A small number may always be able to resist
such pressure. In other words, coercion need not be a ‘success’ term.” (footnotes omitted)).
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must be treated exactly as if it had an ordinance prohibiting
such conduct. We have just held that where an ordinance makes
it unlawful for owners or managers of restaurants to seat whites
and Negroes together, a conviction under the State’s criminal
processes employed in a way which enforces the discrimination
mandated by that ordinance cannot stand. Equally the State
cannot achieve the same result by an official command which
has at least as much coercive effect as an ordinance.48 
Consider, as another example, racially or sexually hostile speech
by a government actor in the government workforce.49 As the
Supreme Court has held, when unwelcome speech or other work-
place behavior targets protected class members and is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment, it con-
stitutes unlawful discriminatory conduct by altering the target’s
terms and conditions of employment.50 In other words, just as
compelling workers to endure miserable working conditions on the
basis of protected class status—for example, assigning them to a
dangerous worksite or an unheated office in the dead of winter
—alters the terms and conditions of employment in violation of
federal or state antidiscrimination law, so too does creating
miserable working conditions by requiring individuals to endure
verbal abuse on the basis of their class status. 
Focusing on such expression’s coercive effects on targets’ working
conditions has at least two significant constitutional implications.
First, when the harassing speaker is a private party, the Court has
characterized him or her to have engaged in discriminatory “con-
duct” largely unprotected by the First Amendment and thus subject
to government regulation through antidiscrimination law.51 Second,
48. 373 U.S. 267, 273 (1963) (citation omitted). 
49. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782-83, 810 (1998) (holding
that certain sexually harassing speech in the government workforce violated Title VII).
50. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
51. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664-65 (2011) (“[T]he First
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing
incidental burdens on speech. That is why a ban on race-based hiring may require employers
to remove ‘White Applicants Only’ signs.” (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476, 487 (1993) (characterizing federal antidiscrimination law’s regulation of harassing
workplace speech as “an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct”);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (“[S]ince words can in some circumstances
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and key to this Article’s inquiry, when the harassing speaker is a
government entity, such action runs afoul of constitutional as well
as statutory equality principles. We might thus recognize such
harassing speech, when delivered by a government actor, as
creating classifications with constitutionally cognizable discrimina-
tory behavioral effects or harms.52 
As another illustration of this dynamic, consider examples from
the educational context that may involve government’s monopolistic
speech to a captive and vulnerable audience.53 Just as workers
confronted with an employer’s racially or sexually harassing speech
on the job may not be free to escape or counter that speech because
of their economic dependence on their continued employment, a
captive audience of young people in the public schools may not be
free to avoid or resist a government actor’s racially harassing or
otherwise discriminatory speech.54 Here, too, we might understand
violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for
example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-
based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the
reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually
derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices.” (citations omitted)). Note
that one can also justify government regulation of harassing workplace speech as consistent
with the First Amendment without resorting to distinctions between protected “speech” and
unprotected “conduct.” For example, many who see such distinctions as inherently artificial
propose that the relevant First Amendment inquiry should be understood instead to turn on
the government’s motive for regulating the contested speech—that is, “whether the harm
that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is
communicating, and more particularly out of the way people can be expected to react to his
message,” or whether the targeted harm would instead arise “even if the defendant’s conduct
had no communicative significance whatever.” John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-97 (1975).
52. See, e.g., Wright v. Rolette Cnty., 417 F.3d 879, 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that
sex-based verbal harassment in a public workforce can support a § 1983 claim); Schwapp v.
Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1997) (implying racially hostile slurs in a
government workforce may support a § 1983 claim); Boutros v. Canton Reg’l Transit Auth.,
997 F.2d 198, 204 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that verbal harassment in a public workplace
based on national origin can support a § 1983 claim). 
53. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening,
89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 940-41 (2009) (suggesting a constitutional right against government-
compelled listening, especially in contexts that raise captive audience concerns like state-
mandated abortion counseling or diversity training).
54. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today?
Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 62, 97-99 (2002) (identifying free speech concerns with respect to government speech
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the government’s hateful speech as creating classifications with
constitutionally cognizable effects because of the behavioral harm
it inflicts by requiring students to endure such harassment. 
Under some circumstances, moreover, government’s hateful
speech may inflict behavioral harm on its targets by facilitating
private parties’ discrimination against them. Along these lines, on
at least one occasion—albeit one long predating the emergence of
“government speech” in the Court’s constitutional vocabulary—the
Supreme Court recognized that government’s racially identifying
speech on a ballot offended equal protection values when it enabled
voters’ private discrimination. In Anderson v. Martin, the Supreme
Court struck down, on equal protection grounds, Louisiana’s law
requiring that political candidates be identified by race on all
ballots and nominating papers, recognizing the danger that gov-
ernment speech might facilitate others’ discriminatory decision
making: 
[T]his case ... has nothing ... to do with the right of a citizen ... to
receive all information concerning a candidate which is neces-
sary to a proper exercise of his franchise. It has to do only with
the right of a State to require or encourage its voters to discrimi-
nate upon the grounds of race.... [B]y placing a racial label on a
candidate at the most crucial stage in the electoral process—the
instant before the vote is cast—the State furnishes a vehicle by
which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against
one group because of race and for another.55 
Recognizing the potential for similar behavioral harms in related
contexts, both state and federal legislatures have enacted statutes
that prohibit public, as well as private, decision makers from
in public schools that seeks to indoctrinate “a captive audience of undeveloped and
impressionable minds”). For these reasons, as discussed infra notes 92-95 and accompanying
text, courts not infrequently consider government’s religious speech in the public school
setting as coercive for Establishment Clause purposes.
Along these lines, courts have interpreted statutory prohibitions on discrimination in
federally funded educational activities to include verbal and other forms of harassment that
are “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims
of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Davis ex rel.
LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (interpreting Title IX’s
prohibition on sex discrimination by federally funded educational activities).
55. 375 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1964). 
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posting discriminatory advertisements or otherwise expressing
discriminatory preferences for employment, housing, or credit appli-
cants based on race, sex, age, national origin, religion, sexual orien-
tation, or other protected characteristics.56 Courts have interpreted
those statutes to prohibit speech that would facilitate discrimina-
tory decision making by both public and private actors. As then-
Judge Ginsburg explained, for example, housing advertisements
violate the Fair Housing Act when they “create[ ] a public impres-
sion that segregation in housing is legal, thus facilitating discrimi-
nation by defendants or other property owners.”57 Here, too, we
might understand such speech as creating classifications with
constitutionally cognizable effects because of the behavioral harm
it inflicts by facilitating discriminatory decisions on the basis of
class status. Because such statutes are generally limited to specific
contexts such as employment and housing, however, they do not
address many instances of government expression. Absent an
applicable statute, the Equal Protection Clause would provide the
sole legal remedy for government’s hateful speech that facilitates
discrimination by private actors.
56. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2006)
(prohibiting employers from printing or publishing “any notice or advertisement ... indicating
any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on age”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(b) (2006) (prohibiting employers from printing or publishing “any notice or advertisement
... indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin”); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 3604(c) (prohibiting “any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d) (prohibiting employers from making disability-based inquiries at various
points in the employment process); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(b) (2011)
(prohibiting creditors from making “any oral or written statement, in advertising or
otherwise, to applicants or prospective applicants that would discourage on a prohibited basis
a reasonable person from making or pursuing an application”). For discussion of such
statutes’ First Amendment implications when applied to private, rather than public, actors’
speech, see Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The First Amendment and Civil
Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 741-77 (2003). 
57. See Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc. 899 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Caroline Mala
Corbin has explored such harms in the Establishment Clause context as well. Corbin, supra
note 46, at 400 (“In sum, government religious speech does not have solely an expressive
dimension but also leads to material harms.... [T]he state perpetuates the stereotypes that
result in discrimination—discrimination that deprives atheists of equality in politics,
employment, education, and custody decisions, and makes them outcasts in their own
community and country.”).
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Finally, government’s hateful speech may also inflict discrimina-
tory behavioral harm by causing its targets to alter their behavior
—for example, by discouraging class members from pursuing
certain opportunities or activities because they reasonably con-
clude that such efforts would be pointless or unwise. Consider, for
example, the possible effects of a state capitol’s or courthouse’s
racist proclamation on African Americans’ willingness to enter that
building to petition the legislature, file a complaint, or serve as a
witness or juror.58 Along these lines, courts and legislatures that
have recognized this danger have interpreted antidiscrimination
statutes to prohibit public or private decision makers’ discrimina-
tory speech that discourages protected class members from seeking
employment, housing, or other important opportunities. For ex-
ample, several circuits have interpreted the Federal Fair Housing
Act to prohibit housing or real estate advertisements that would
discourage reasonable readers of a particular class from responding
to them.59 Here, too, we might understand such speech as classify-
ing its targets in a way that inflicts discriminatory behavioral
harm. And again, the Equal Protection Clause provides the only
potential opportunity for legal redress in many cases involving
58. See Trenticosta & Collins, supra note 15, at 127 (hypothesizing the effects of a
courthouse’s display of the Confederate flag on due process, privileges and immunities, and
equal protection rights); James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the
Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 525 (1991) (asserting that
a state capitol’s display of the Confederate flag might inhibit African Americans from
exercising their right to petition); see also Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou
Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment
Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 703 (2008) (describing the deterrent effects of displaying
Christian messages on courthouses on non-Christian litigants and witnesses).
59. See, e.g., White v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 475 F.3d 898, 905-06 (7th Cir.
2007) (“The inquiry under this objective standard is whether the alleged statement would
suggest to an ‘ordinary listener’ that a person with a particular [protected] status is preferred
or disfavored for the housing in question.”); Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 44 F.3d
553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[E]very circuit that has considered a claim [under the Fair Housing
Act] has held that an objective ‘ordinary reader’ standard should be applied in determining
what is ‘indicated’ by an ad.”); Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer,
Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 647-49 (6th Cir. 1991) (appearing to adopt the Second Circuit’s Ragin
interpretation while simultaneously holding that a single ad with a large number of white
models failed to state a cognizable claim under the Ragin rationale); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co.,
923 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (interpreting the Fair Housing Act to prohibit “any ad
that would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race from answering it”). 
2012] GOVERNMENT’S HATEFUL SPEECH 181
government’s hateful speech because such antidiscrimination
statutes are limited to specific contexts.60 
B. Expressive Harms
In analyses of “hard law” that may also apply to government
speech and other forms of “soft law,”61 a number of scholars have
explored potential expressive harms caused by governmental
actions that communicate the government’s view of class members’
inferiority. Under such an expressive meaning approach, the gov-
ernment inflicts a constitutional wrong simply by sending a
message of inferiority based on class status, regardless of whether
listeners suffer emotional distress or experience material harm
as a result.62 Deborah Hellman, for example, has applied expres-
sive meaning theory in the equal protection context, albeit foc-
using on the government’s action or “hard law,” rather than on
government speech or other forms of “soft law.”63 She concluded
60. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s regulations take a similar approach, forbidding
creditors from making oral or written statements “that would discourage on a prohibited
basis a reasonable person from making or pursuing [a credit] application.” 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.4(b).
61. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
62. Many expressive meaning scholars use the term “expressive harms” to describe this
dynamic. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1543-44 (2000) (“We reject the view that no
harm results from trying to humiliate another person, so long as one does not succeed. Action
taken with the purpose of humiliation is an expressive harm in itself.”); William M. Carter,
Jr., Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2, 8 (2011) (distinguishing
“expressive harms” from “tangible harms”); Dorf, supra note 43, at 1279-83 (describing the
“expressive harm” of various government actions). But note that some expressive meaning
theorists deliberately choose a different vocabulary, focusing on expressive “wrongs,” rather
than on expressive “harms” or “effects,” to emphasize the wrong of government’s demeaning
message in moral, rather than consequentialist, terms. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN
IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 30 (2008) (“Demeaning is wrong because the fact that people are
of equal moral worth requires that we treat them as such. We must not treat each other as
lesser beings even when doing so causes no harm.”); see also Dorf, supra note 43, at 1282
(“One might regard some expressive harms as wrongs in themselves in the way that
deontological moral theorists regard some actions—such as telling a lie—as inherently
wrong, even if no one suffers any concrete harm as a result; strong deontologists could judge
an action wrongful even if no one were made worse off by it.” (footnote omitted)).
63. See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2000) (“[W]e ought to judge whether state action violates Equal Protection not by
looking at the intent of those who enacted laws nor by looking at the effect a law has in the
domains in which it operates. Rather, we ought to judge whether laws violate Equal
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that a governmental act is repugnant to equal protection values
when its meaning conflicts with the government’s obligation to treat
each person with equal concern, even absent any showing of stig-
matic effect on its targets—that is, even absent any showing of
psychological or reputational injury, or behavioral harm.64 Deborah
Brake similarly defines the “fundamental principle of equality [to]
require[ ] equal concern, a broader principle than mere equal
treatment. An equal concern principle must be sensitive to inequal-
ity in social relations and must reject actions that devalue and
exclude persons from equal membership in a shared community.”65
Although, to date, expressive meaning scholars have made this
point in the context of evaluating “hard” rather than “soft” law,66
whether the government delivers that hateful message through
“hard” law or “soft” should be immaterial if these scholars are right
about the sort of expressive harm that is constitutionally salient for
equal protection purposes.67 Antisubordination theorists are espe-
cially likely to agree that government’s hateful speech perpetuates
longstanding patterns of hierarchy and subordination by inflicting
Protection by looking at the meaning or expressive content of the law or policy at issue.”). 
64. See id. at 14 (“It is a strength of my theory that people can challenge state action
without needing to assert that they have been stigmatized. Some cultural critics have
attacked what they see as the growth of a culture of victimhood. My theory ensures that
governmental action does not denigrate any person or group, while simultaneously not
discouraging the thick skin that ought to be treated as a civic virtue.” (footnote omitted)). 
65. Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 524 (2004); see also Helmreich,
supra note 34, at 118 (“[T]o harm someone expressively is to treat her as one would if one
harbored insulting attitudes towards her. It is, in other words, to treat her in an objectively
insulting way.”). 
66. Focusing on the expressive meaning underlying various instances of “hard,” rather
than “soft,” law, William Carter urges that government messages about race should not
generally trigger equal protection scrutiny. See Carter, supra note 62, at 7; id. at 8 (“Where
the harm alleged from government race consciousness is primarily expressive and
nonsubordinating (that is, it does not result in differential treatment, racialized distribution
of a limited resource, or racial stigmatization to any appreciable degree), this Article argues
that First Amendment principles can be helpful in assessing whether the expression amounts
to a constitutional injury.”). Professor Carter leaves open the possibility, however, that a
different analysis might apply to government’s hateful speech. Id. at 8 n.23. 
67. Jeffrey Helmreich makes a similar point in the context of “hard law.” See Helmreich,
supra note 34, at 121 (“The possibility of expressive subordination, then, challenges any
putative dichotomy between tangibly disadvantaging people based on race, on the one hand,
and merely communicating a racially charged message, on the other. Expressive
subordination marks an important third category.”).
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expressive harm on the basis of class status.68 Some anticlas-
sification theorists, however, emphasize the difference between
“hard” and “soft” law as constitutionally relevant in this context and
thus may resist characterizing government speech that inflicts
expressive harm as a cognizable classification for equal protection
purposes given the comparative diffuseness of such “effects.”69 But
perhaps some other anticlassification theorists may agree that gov-
ernment’s hateful speech classifies its targets in ways that should
be understood to violate the Equal Protection Clause, especially if
we recall anticlassification theory’s roots in both moral and instr-
umental grounds.70 Under this view, government’s hateful speech
can be seen as not only morally offensive in demeaning its targets
based on their class status but also instrumentally dangerous by
contributing to social divisions and instability. In short, govern-
ment’s hateful speech can communicate a subordinating message
repugnant to most antisubordination theorists and can classify its
targets in ways that may trouble at least some anticlassification
theorists. 
         III. COURTS’ CONTRASTING EQUAL PROTECTION AND        
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSES OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
The preceding Part explored a variety of behavioral and expres-
sive harms potentially inflicted by government’s hateful speech.
This Part now describes lower courts’ failure to grapple thought-
fully with these possibilities when considering equal protection
challenges to such expression. It then contrasts courts’ more ex-
pansive understanding of constitutionally salient harms when
evaluating Establishment Clause challenges to government’s reli-
gious speech. 
A. Equal Protection Clause Analysis
In cases decided long before the recent emergence of the Court’s
“government speech” vocabulary, the Court appears to have
68. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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recognized at least two situations in which government speech
might deny its targets “the equal protection of the laws.”71 For
example, we might understand the Court’s decision in Lombard v.
Louisiana to conclude that government speech commanding dis-
crimination by private actors violates the Equal Protection Clause,72
and its decision in Anderson v. Martin to mean that government
speech that facilitates such discrimination does so as well.73 Despite
these precedents, however, lower courts have been generally un-
willing to credit equal protection challenges to government speech. 
More specifically, the small number of cases in this area involve
various constitutional challenges to governments’ expressive dis-
play of the Confederate flag. There the courts first required plain-
tiffs to show that the government’s expressive choice had both a
discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect.74 They then
defined the requisite discriminatory effects narrowly,75 found none,
and thus avoided inquiry into whether the government’s speech was
actually motivated by a discriminatory purpose.76 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
74. E.g., Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 529 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[The plaintiff] must first
demonstrate that the flying of the Georgia flag produces disproportionate effects along racial
lines, and then must prove that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor
behind the enactment of the flag legislation.”).
75. Id. at 530 (“In order to demonstrate disproportionate impact along racial lines,
appellant must present specific factual evidence to demonstrate that the Georgia flag
presently imposes on African-Americans as a group a measurable burden or denies them an
identifiable benefit.”).
76. Id. at 531 n.8 (“We recognize that the Georgia flag conveys mixed meanings; to some
it honors those who fought in the Civil War and to others it flies as a symbol of oppression....
Having concluded that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Georgia flag presently
imposes a discriminatory racial effect, we need not decide whether discrimination against
African-Americans was a motivating factor in the flag bill’s passage.”); see also NAACP v.
Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Because there are two accounts of why Alabama
flies the [Confederate] flag, however, it is not certain that the flag was hoisted for racially
discriminatory reasons.” (citation omitted)).
Although a detailed inquiry into the intent underlying governments’ expressive choice in
this context is beyond the scope of this Article, a number of courts, scholars, and other
commentators have extensively parsed the evidence that governments intended to
communicate a message of white supremacy in choosing to display the Confederate flag. See,
e.g., Coleman, 117 F.3d at 528-29 (“As many of Georgia’s politicians and citizens openly
resisted the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings, increasing numbers of white
Southerners began expressing renewed interest in their Confederate heritage. It was in this
environment of open hostility to the Supreme Court’s civil rights rulings and of developing
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For example, in NAACP v. Hunt, the Eleventh Circuit found that
Alabama’s expressive choice to fly the Confederate flag above the
state capitol dome inflicted no discriminatory harm on African
Americans. The panel concluded simply that whites as well as
African Americans were offended by the flag’s display, and that
such offense thus did not establish the requisite discriminatory
harm for equal protection purposes: “[T]here is no unequal applica-
tion of the state policy; all citizens are exposed to the flag. Citizens
of all races are offended by its position.”77 Thus not only did the
court fail to explore the possibility that the flag might inflict
discriminatory behavioral harm—for example, that it might deter
African Americans from pursuing certain activities or opportunities
—but it also rejected expressive harm as a constitutionally suffi-
cient injury.
Several years later, and for similar reasons, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected an equal protection challenge to Georgia’s incorporation of
the Confederate flag into its own state flag design.78 There the
plaintiff focused specifically on the flag’s differential harms as
experienced by African Americans, alleging that “the flag’s Confed-
erate symbol, which is often used by and associated with hate
groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, inspires in him fear of violence,
causes him to devalue himself as a person, and sends an exclu-
sionary message to Georgia’s African-American citizens.”79 The
panel, however, found the plaintiff ’s evidence insufficient to prove
the required discriminatory effect: 
After carefully reviewing the record, and drawing all inferences
in the light most favorable to appellant, we find no evidence of
interest in Confederate history that the Georgia General Assembly acted to redesign its state
flag. It chose as an official state symbol an emblem that historically had been associated with
white supremacy and resistance to federal authority.”); Daniels v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 722 So. 2d 136, 139 (Miss. 1998) (Banks, J., concurring) (“Quite recently, many
state governments adopted the battle flag as a symbol of continued support of white
supremacy, segregation and discrimination against persons of black African descent.”).
77. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1562; see also Daniels, 722 So. 2d at 139 (majority opinion)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to the county’s display of Confederate flags on beaches
and other county property because just “[a]s in Hunt, the record in the ... case contain[ed] no
indication that the flying of the single Confederate Flag at Eight Flags serve[d] to deprive
any citizens of the State of any constitutionally protected right”).
78. Coleman, 117 F.3d at 531.
79. Id. at 529.
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a similar discriminatory impact imposed by the Georgia flag....
He testified that the Confederate symbol in the Georgia flag
places him in imminent fear of lawlessness and violence and
that an African-American friend of his, upon seeing the Georgia
flag in a courtroom, decided to plead guilty rather than litigate
a traffic ticket. This anecdotal evidence of intangible harm to
two individuals, without any evidence regarding the impact
upon other African-American citizens or the comparative effect
of the flag on white citizens, is insufficient to establish ‘dispropor-
tionate effects along racial lines.’ Coleman also offered the
affidavit of another witness who testified that, in his opinion,
the flying of the flag promotes violence against blacks and
continues to represent a symbol of Georgia’s efforts against
integration. This mere allegation, without any accompanying
support, also is not sufficient to demonstrate a disproportionate
racial effect.80
The panel thus cursorily declined to credit the various behavioral
and expressive harms alleged by individual African Americans as
establishing the requisite effects for equal protection purposes.81 
In short, even assuming arguendo that the Confederate flag
communicates an intentionally hateful government message, which
remains contested,82 the courts concluded that the harms or effects
of such expression were not sufficient to establish a violation of the
80. Id. at 530 (citation omitted); see also id. (“In order to demonstrate disproportionate
impact along racial lines, appellant must present specific factual evidence to demonstrate
that the Georgia flag presently imposes on African-Americans as a group a measurable
burden or denies them an identifiable benefit.”).
81. Note, however, that the panel left open the possibility that other evidence might
support an equal protection challenge to the government’s expressive choice in this context.
See id. at 530 n.6 (“We recognize that a government action may in some instances violate the
Constitution because it encourages private discrimination. There is no evidence in the record
of this case, however, that connects the Georgia flag to private discrimination or racial
violence.” (citations omitted)). Whether the plaintiffs in these cases failed to offer such
evidence, or whether the courts simply ignored it, remains unclear. See Capers, supra note
8, at 141 (“Rather than relying on empirical data or expert testimony and reports from
sociologists, as the NAACP had done to great effect in Brown, the plaintiffs in Hunt and
Coleman instead relied on personal, anecdotal evidence. One could argue that the failure on
the part of the plaintiffs to present data supporting their claim of disparate impact was fatal,
though whether the Eleventh Circuit would have been receptive to, or persuaded by, such
data is questionable.” (footnote omitted)); Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 58, at 728
(“One problem [with the Confederate flag litigation] may have been the plaintiffs’ not having
produced sufficient evidence of marginalization.”).
82. See supra note 76.
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Equal Protection Clause. The next section contrasts courts’ more
expansive understanding of the constitutionally relevant harms of
government speech in the Establishment Clause context. 
B. Establishment Clause Analysis
The Establishment Clause context offers the only area outside of
the Free Speech Clause83 in which courts have, to date, seriously
wrestled with the constitutional implications of government speech.
Indeed, on a number of occasions the Supreme Court has upheld
Establishment Clause challenges to what we now understand as
government expression.84 There the Court has held that government
action—including, but not limited to, government’s religious speech
—violates the Establishment Clause given a finding of either
impermissible purpose85 or effect;86 moreover, it has defined the
requisite harmful effects comparatively broadly.87
Please note that I do not suggest that the Court’s Establishment
Clause precedent in any way binds courts considering equal pro-
tection challenges to government speech. Instead I simply suggest
83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 867-74, 881 (2005) (striking down
Ten Commandment displays in Kentucky courthouses as an Establishment Clause violation);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312-13 (2000) (striking down a public school’s
religious invocation before a high school football game as an Establishment Clause violation);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593-94 (1987) (striking down a public school district’s
required teaching of creation science as an Establishment Clause violation); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (striking down a public school’s daily prayers as an Establishment
Clause violation).
85. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) (“In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First
Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in
general.”). Note, however, that courts’ Establishment Clause analysis rarely focuses on
governmental purpose because of the evidentiary challenges inherent in proving
governmental intent. See B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 503-04 (2005); see also id. at 502
(“In practice, however, the role of intent in deciding the religious symbol cases has been
decidedly minimized.”).
86. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (finding an Establishment
Clause violation upon a showing of any one of three elements: (1) that the government’s
contested action was not motivated by a “secular legislative purpose”; (2) that the action’s
“principal or primary effect” was to advance or inhibit religion; or (3) that the action
“foster[ed] an excessive government entanglement with religion” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
87. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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that we can choose to learn from courts’ experience wrestling with
whether and when government’s religious speech impermissibly
“establishes” religion when confronted with the parallel challenge
of determining whether and when government’s hateful speech
might deny “the equal protection of the laws.” Note too that the
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine is not without controversy.88
Indeed, the Court has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate
approach to such problems; contemporary divisions center primarily
—but not only—on the choice between coercion and endorsement
analyses.89 In any event, as described below, courts considering
Establishment Clause challenges to government’s religious speech
have been considerably more willing to accept a wider array of
harms as constitutionally salient than have lower courts assessing
the equal protection implications of government’s allegedly hateful
speech. 
1. Coercion Analysis
Some propose a coercion analysis for determining when, if ever,
government violates the Establishment Clause through its religious
speech or other action.90 Under this view, government does not vio-
late the Establishment Clause unless and until it coerces behavior.
As articulated by Justice Kennedy, who is among those most often
associated with coercion analysis: “[G]overnment may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise ....
Forbidden involvements include compelling or coercing participa-
tion or attendance at a religious activity, requiring religious oaths
to obtain government office or benefits, or delegating government
power to religious groups.”91 Under this approach, courts should
88. See infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has confounded the
lower courts and rendered the constitutionality of displays of religious imagery on
government property anyone’s guess.”).
90. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 940 (1986) (“Recognition of the centrality of coercion—or, more
precisely, its opposite, religious choice—to Establishment Clause analysis would lead to a
proscription of all government action that has the purpose and effect of coercing or altering
religious belief or action.” (footnote omitted)). 
91. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-60 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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find government to violate the Establishment Clause only when its
religious or antireligious speech—or other action—coerces behav-
ioral change, rather than when it inflicts expressive harm.
To be sure, divisions remain even among coercion theorists about
that test’s application to specific facts.92 Most important for pur-
poses of this Article is the question of whether and when govern-
ment’s religious speech alone can coerce behavior, as some coercion
theorists are quicker to identify a listener’s behavior as coerced by
the government’s religious speech than others. For example, Justice
Kennedy is open to a comparatively wide range of behavioral harms
when assessing the potentially coercive effects of government
action, including government’s religious speech.93 He thus defines
impermissible “coercion” relatively broadly to include government’s
religious speech that influences onlookers’ behavior through peer
pressure and other social dynamics—as he found to be the case with
a prayer at a public high school graduation that students feel
pressure to attend and not to leave.94 Justice Scalia, in contrast,
defines impermissible “coercion” quite narrowly to include only the
threat or imposition of government punishment.95
2. Endorsement Analysis 
Justice O’Connor is among those most commonly associated with
endorsement analysis.96 She identified the key constitutional harms
imposed by an Establishment Clause violation as expressive in
nature; under this view, the government offends a constitutional
commitment to religious pluralism when it delivers a message that
citizens’ status varies based on their religion or nonreligion. She
92. See McConnell, supra note 90, at 941 (“A noncoercion standard, of course, would not
answer all questions. For example, it obviously would not answer the question, ‘What is
coercion?’ Enormous variance exists between the persecutions of old and the many subtle
ways in which government action can distort religious choice today.”). 
93. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
94. Id. at 593-95.
95. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was a hallmark of historical
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by
force of law and threat of penalty.”). 
96. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 122-28 (2007) (explaining the Court’s endorsement analysis as recognizing
that government sponsorship of religious symbols endorses one group at the expense of
another).
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considered this to be true regardless of whether the government’s
message inflicted emotional distress or other psychological harm
upon onlookers. More specifically, she explained the endorsement
test as follows:
As a theoretical matter, the endorsement test captures the
essential command of the Establishment Clause, namely, that
government must not make a person’s religious beliefs relevant
to his or her standing in the political community by conveying
a message “that religion or a particular religious belief is fa-
vored or preferred.” ... If government is to be neutral in matters
of religion, rather than showing either favoritism or disapproval
towards citizens based on their personal religious choices,
government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of
some citizens without sending a clear message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders or less than full members of the political
community.97 
For this reason, Justice O’Connor objected to coercion analysis as
incompletely capturing the nature of an Establishment Clause vio-
lation: 
An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only “coercive”
practices or overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails
to take account of the numerous more subtle ways that govern-
ment can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a mes-
sage of disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately
protect the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of
the members of our pluralistic political community.98 
97. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 669 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders ... and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.”); id. at 694 (“Every government practice must
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement
or disapproval of religion.”). For further discussion, see Marci A. Hamilton, The Endorsement
Factor, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 355 (2011) (“It is my view that ‘endorsement’ is a new factor [in
the Lemon test], not a new test, and that it is visionary and crucially important in this era
of religious terrorism and triumphalism.”). 
98. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627-28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). Professor Corbin similarly maintains that
a sufficient constitutional harm for Establishment Clause purposes is 
caused by the expressive content of the law or policy at issue. The focus is on
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Justice Kennedy, in contrast, views the endorsement test and its
focus on expressive harm as inappropriately “border[ing] on latent
hostility toward religion,” and “install[ing] federal courts as jealous
guardians of an absolute ‘wall of separation.’”99 
In short, coercion and endorsement theorists disagree as to
whether a challenger must show that the government’s religious
speech caused behavioral, as opposed to expressive, harm to
demonstrate an Establishment Clause violation. Whether either
coercion or endorsement, or even some other analysis, currently
commands a majority of the Court on Establishment Clause ques-
tions remains unclear.100 And even if we agree on the appropriate
test, considerable room for disagreement remains as to whether its
application to particular facts would support a finding of coercion
or endorsement. To be sure, government’s religious speech by itself
will generally violate the coercion principle in a narrower universe
of cases than the endorsement principle. Consider, for example, a
public school’s decision to lead its students in prayer at grad-
uation101 and a legislature’s decision to start its session with
denominational prayer.102 Both governmental choices appear to
endorse religion;103 whether either violates the coercion principle
the message conveyed by the state action rather than its intent or its practical
effect.... Under an expressivist approach, the government violates the
Establishment Clause’s equality component if its religious speech fails to treat
believers and nonbelievers with equal concern. Again, the injury turns not on
intent or on material harms, but on the state’s message of unequal worth. 
Corbin, supra note 46, at 380-81 (footnotes omitted).
99. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). 
100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
102. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983); see also id. at 792-95 (holding that the
Nebraska state legislature did not violate the Establishment Clause by opening each session
with a chaplain’s nonsectarian prayer). 
103. See, e.g., Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 342, 349, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2011)
(striking down legislative prayer with specific references to Christianity by distinguishing
Marsh as involving “nonsectarian prayers that solemnize the legislative task and seek to
unite rather than divide,” and asserting that “legislative prayer must strive to be
nondenominational so long as that is reasonably possible—it should send a signal of welcome
rather than exclusion.... [H]owever, the Board’s policy falls short. It resulted in sectarian
invocations meeting after meeting that advanced Christianity and that made at least two
citizens feel uncomfortable, unwelcome, and unwilling to participate in the public affairs of
Forsyth County.... While it is true that plaintiffs were not coerced, they claim pressure to
stand and bow their heads along with the rest or risk having their civic participation
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depends on how broadly or narrowly one defines coercion. While
Justice Scalia, for example, would find that neither coerces behavior
because he sees attendees as simply free not to join the prayer,104
Justice Kennedy would find that high school students—unlike
adults—might feel coerced to participate given their youth and the
importance of the occasion.105 In contrast, neither Justices Kennedy
nor Scalia would find the government’s public display of religious
symbols to coerce onlookers’ behavior.106 As another example of how
the choice of analysis might well determine the outcome of an
Establishment Clause challenge to government speech, consider a
state legislature’s decision to issue a specialty state license plate
that features a cross and Christian message—but not to issue
plates featuring symbols of any other religions—that drivers are
free, but not compelled, to buy and display on their vehicles.107
Assuming that such plates are characterized as delivering the gov-
ernment’s speech,108 they would likely violate endorsement,109 but
not coercion, principles. Along the same lines, the choice between
coercion and endorsement analysis may also determine the outcome
of Establishment Clause challenges to city or county choices to
adorn their governmental seal with a cross.110 
correspondingly devalued.”).
104. Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 592-95 (majority opinion).
106. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The crèche and the menorah are purely
passive symbols of religious holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by
these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs.”).
107. See Summers v. Adams, 669 F. Supp. 2d 637, 657 (D.S.C. 2009) (striking down South
Carolina’s approval of a specialty license plate that featured a cross and the statement “I
Believe”). 
108. Lower courts are currently split on whether specialty license plates are best
characterized as the speech of the government that approves and produces them, or of the
private party that buys and displays them. See Helen Norton, Shining a Light on
Democracy’s Dark Lagoon, 61 S.C. L. REV. 535, 537-41 (2010).
109. Summers, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (“This is true not only because the ‘I believe’ plate
has the effect of any other form of ‘advertising,’ but, more ominously, because legislative
authorization of this plate (and no other religious plate) signals that the referenced religion
is uniquely worthy of legislative endorsement and promotion.”).
110. Compare Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a city seal’s inclusion of the Christian cross violated the Establishment Clause),
Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir. 1985) (same), and ACLU v.
City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (same), with ACLU v. Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 291, 299 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding the state motto
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Neither coercion nor endorsement analysis guarantees easy
answers in all cases. But once one acknowledges that government’s
religious speech—by itself—can be constitutionally impermissible
in at least some contexts, regardless of how broadly or narrowly we
define those contexts, then we might recognize the same with
respect to government speech that expresses hatred, hostility, or
animus on the basis of class status. Indeed, the potential harms
inflicted on “outsiders” by government’s racist, homophobic, or
otherwise discriminatory speech seem at least as significant as
those inflicted on religious outsiders by government speech that
endorses or disapproves of religion.111 In other words, just as gov-
ernment’s religious speech under certain circumstances imper-
missibly “establishes” religion in violation of the First Amendment,
so too might government speech sometimes impermissibly deny
certain individuals “the equal protection of the laws.”112 
The remainder of this Article seeks to start a conversation about
how courts—and the rest of us—might think about the constitu-
tional implications of government’s hateful speech. It thus urges
that we start to ask a different and more difficult set of questions
than those that have historically been posed in the equal protection
context: those that focus not on whether the government has en-
“With God, All Things are Possible” as compelling no religious participation and indicating
no denominational preference), and Ky. Office of Homeland Sec. v. Christerson, 371 S.W.3d
754, 763 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that a state statute requiring the state to publicize the
legislature’s findings that the state’s safety and security could not be achieved “apart from
reliance on Almighty God” did not violate the Establishment Clause).
111. See Note, Nontaxpayer Standing, Religious Favoritism, and the Distribution of
Government Benefits: The Outer Bounds of the Endorsement Test, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1999,
2017-18 (2010) (“Surely the message that one is an ‘outsider[ ], not [a] full member [ ] of the
political community’ because of one’s race is not somehow less injurious than the message
that one is an outsider because of one’s religion. For many, race is just as central to self-
identity as religion; indeed, race may be more central because it is immutable. Moreover, the
scars that remain from our nation’s sad history of excluding racial minorities from full
political participation are surely at least as deep as those that remain from past instances
of religious exclusion, and very likely a good deal deeper.” (footnotes omitted)). Indeed, some
might argue that the harms of discriminatory government speech on the basis of race,
gender, national origin, et cetera, are greater than the harms of government speech that
delivers a message of outsider status based on religion or nonreligion. For example, some
suggest that, in America’s pluralistic society, “[r]eligion is under no special disability in
public life ... it is at least as protected and encouraged as any other form of belief and
association—in some ways more so.” Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion,
1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also supra Part II.
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gaged in “hard” law or “soft,” but instead on whether government
speech denies its targets the equal protection of the laws in consti-
tutionally cognizable ways. 
    IV. RECONSIDERING EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO  
GOVERNMENT’S HATEFUL SPEECH 
Although not without its controversy, the Court’s Establishment
Clause doctrine offers a potentially helpful parallel in its approach
to considering the range of constitutionally suspicious harms
potentially posed by government speech. This Part thus draws from
the Establishment Clause experience to consider possible applica-
tions of behavioral harm and expressive meaning analyses to gov-
ernment’s hateful speech. 
A. Behavioral Harm Analysis
First, we might approach equal protection challenges to hateful
government speech by focusing our inquiry on whether and when
such expression inflicts certain types of behavioral harm—that is,
whether the government’s expressive classification facilitates pri-
vate parties’ discrimination or deters its targets from engaging in
certain activities. This approach helps explain both Lombard v.
Louisiana, in which the Court found government speech that
commanded private segregation to be unconstitutional,113 and
Anderson v. Martin, in which the Court found unconstitutional the
government’s racially identifying speech on ballots for fear that the
government was thus facilitating voters’ racially discriminatory
choices.114 A focus on behavioral harm analysis similarly helps
explain why verbal harassment by a government actor in the public
workforce or in public schools may violate equal protection values:
such speech forces its targets to endure altered and diminished
employment and educational conditions on the basis of protected
113. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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class status.115 In other words, such speech classifies its targets in
a way that inflicts discriminatory behavioral harm.
A behavioral harm approach also offers opportunities for recon-
sidering our understanding of the ways in which hateful govern-
ment speech may cause such harm. As we know from parallel
debates over government coercion in the Establishment Clause
context, behavioral harm analysis leaves room for advocates to
argue, and courts to evaluate, whether and when government
speech impermissibly coerces or otherwise influences behavior in a
discriminatory way.116 For example, we might understand the Equal
Protection Clause to prohibit government speech that expresses
hostility on the basis of class status in a way that would cause a
reasonable class member to alter her behavior—for example, by
discouraging class members from pursuing a government job or
petitioning the legislature because they reasonably conclude that
such efforts would be pointless or unwise. Indeed, antidiscrim-
ination statutes often take this approach, and courts have inter-
preted such laws to prohibit decisionmaker speech that would
reasonably deter a protected class member from pursuing employ-
ment, housing, or credit opportunities.117 
Such an approach may be attractive to both anticlassification
and antisubordination theorists, in that it requires a showing of
115. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also Pillard, supra note 10, at 958
(“[T]he conduct-shaping purpose of sex education curricula makes them vulnerable to equal
protection challenge even if communicating retrogressive sex roles in traditional academic
classes might not be.”).
116. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the differing views of coercion offered by Justices
Kennedy and Scalia).
117. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Under a behavioral harm approach,
the deterred activity need not be constitutionally protected to establish the requisite
discriminatory harm. What matters instead is whether the government’s hateful speech
causes adverse and discriminatory behavioral change. To be sure, government speech that
deters constitutionally protected activity might violate constitutional provisions in addition
to the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 43, at 1278 (concluding that “the
struggle over the term marriage also involves an element of coerced private speech” in
violation of the First Amendment); Forman, supra note 58, at 516 (urging that the
Confederate flag display violates the First Amendment because it chills African Americans’
speech rights); Trenticosta & Collins, supra note 15, at 127 (arguing that the government’s
Confederate flag display in front of a courthouse may change the behavior of defendants or
jurors in ways that violate the Due Process Clause); Tebbe, supra note 4, at 15-17 (describing
how some racialized government speech may silence citizens or otherwise distort public
discourse in violation of the Free Speech Clause).
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relatively concrete and subordinating behavioral “effects” or
“harms” of government’s expressive classifications. Behavioral
harm analysis may also be comparatively attractive to those con-
cerned about the indeterminacy of assessing a governmental
message’s expressive meaning; indeed, the practical challenges of
expressive harm analysis, described in some detail below,118 may
convince some that behavioral harm analysis is the better approach. 
To be sure, however, behavioral harm analysis has its drawbacks.
As explored in more detail below, for example, such an approach
involves significant practical challenges in proving the causal
relationship between the government’s hateful speech and private
parties’ behavior119—just as we have seen disagreements among
coercion theorists about whether and when government’s religious
speech actually coerces, or causes, behavioral change.120 
B. Expressive Meaning Analysis 
Expressive meaning analysis would focus on the expressive,
rather than the behavioral, implications of government’s hateful
speech. Drawing from expressivist scholars’ analysis of the expres-
sive wrongs inflicted by government’s discriminatory conduct, or
“hard law,” we might similarly understand government speech, or
“soft law,” to violate the Constitution when the government’s ex-
pressive meaning is repugnant to equal protection values.121 Indeed,
a focus on expressive meaning seems especially appropriate when
the challenged governmental action is actually the government’s
expression. In other words, if the Equal Protection Clause demands
that government treat individual members of the polity with equal
respect and equal concern,122 then the government’s speech alone
may violate this constitutional commitment when it communicates
exclusion or inferiority on the basis of class status. 
Under an expressive meaning analysis, we would focus on
whether the government has communicated a message of hatred,
hostility, or animus based on class status, regardless of whether the
118. See infra notes 138-43, 146-52, 158-60 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
121. See supra Part II.B.
122. See Brake, supra note 65, at 560-70.
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message succeeds in inflicting psychological damage on or lowering
public opinion of its targets—and certainly regardless of whether
the message carries behavioral effects like encouraging private
discrimination against, or deterring certain activity by, protected
class members.123 Such an expressive meaning analysis would
identify the constitutionally relevant wrong as the government’s
imprimatur on a message communicating that its targets are
outsiders or something other than full members of the political
community.124
This approach may be especially attractive to antisubordination
theorists because it focuses on whether the government’s speech
sends a demeaning, or subordinating, message. Whether it appeals
to anticlassification theorists depends on their willingness to in-
clude expressive harms as among the constitutionally cognizable
effects of government’s classifications. While I anticipate many will
resist,125 the moral and instrumental roots of pure anticlassification
theory126 may lead some to agree that the government’s expressive
classifications, too, can violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Government’s hateful speech can be seen as not only morally offen-
sive in demeaning its targets based on class status but also instr-
umentally dangerous by contributing to social divisions and
instability.127
123. See supra Part II.B.
124. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 2.
125. For example, I do not expect that a proposal to extend expressive meaning analysis
to equal protection challenges to government speech will persuade those already skeptical
about endorsement analysis in the Establishment Clause context. See infra notes 139-43 and
accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
127. Michael Dorf and Nelson Tebbe have each written very thoughtful articles that
address some of the same issues. See supra notes 4, 43. My focus in this paper is
simultaneously both broader and narrower than each of theirs. Professor Dorf does not focus
solely on government speech—my exclusive target here—but instead more broadly on the
expressive meaning of a wide range of government actions that include, but are not limited
to, speech. See Dorf, supra note 43, at 1275 (“[This Article] articulates and unpacks the thesis
that the Constitution forbids government acts, statements, and symbols that label some
persons or relationships as second-class—with a special focus on those government actions,
like the denial of the term marriage to some but not all couples, that have ‘only’ a symbolic
impact.”). On the other hand, because I am less confident that anticlassification theorists will
embrace an expressive meaning approach, I focus more broadly on behavioral as well as
expressive harm approaches to the government speech problem. See supra Part IV.A-B. Like
Professor Dorf, Professor Tebbe focuses primarily on expressive rather than behavioral
harms. However, he is interested in a broader constitutional theory of “government
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C. Applications and Concerns
This Section discusses how these proposals might apply to some
specific situations, and in so doing, anticipates and addresses
possible concerns. To start, how might behavioral harm and expres-
sive meaning analyses apply to the hypotheticals posed in this
paper’s introduction: a government’s decision to adopt the motto
“White Supremacy Forever” or an executive proclamation or legis-
lative resolution declaring that members of the Latino, Arab, or
GLBT communities are not worthy of respect?128 
A behavioral harm approach would focus on allegations that such
government speech facilitates private actors’ discrimination against
class members or that it deters reasonable class members from
engaging in certain behavior.129 Evidence in support of such a claim
could include the testimony of class members that the government’s
hateful speech reasonably discouraged them from filing a claim
before that entity, participating in a meeting of that body, or
engaging in other related activity; expert testimony about the
deterrent effects on class members generally; or evidence that the
government’s speech facilitated discrimination by private actors.130 
To be sure, in light of the significant evidentiary challenges often
inherent in proving a causal link between government speech and
private behavior, skeptics may well doubt the ability of behavioral
harm analysis to provide meaningful redress for the harms caused
by discriminatory government speech.131 Nonetheless, such an
analysis permits us to consider those situations in which discrimi-
natory government speech may inflict behavioral harms repugnant
to equal protection values—that is, government speech that denies
certain individuals the equal protection of the laws—more fully
nondisparagement” located, in part, in the Free Speech and Due Process Clauses as well as
in the Equal Protection Clause. See Tebbe, supra note 4, at 5. I am specifically interested in
the Equal Protection Clause as a constitutional limitation on government’s hateful speech.
128. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Part IV.A.
130. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 43, at 1281-82 (noting causation challenges of collateral
consequences arguments). For an example of attempting to bridge this causal gap, see
Corbin, supra note 46, at 398-400 (discussing arguments that government’s religious speech
“causes” constitutional harm to nonbelievers).
2012] GOVERNMENT’S HATEFUL SPEECH 199
than does the status quo, which too often ignores or dismisses those
harms.
In contrast, an expressive meaning analysis of the hypotheticals
posed above is comparatively easy because they involve examples
of government speech that clearly delivers the governmental
message that targeted class members are second-class citizens.
Indeed, I chose these examples precisely because their expressive
meaning was uncontested.132 
1. Indeterminacy
Of course, few cases will be so easy, and many will invite
controversy not only over any behavioral harms inflicted, but also
over the precise nature of the expressive meaning of the govern-
ment’s message. The Confederate flag cases offer a particularly
prominent example. Behavioral harm theorists would look for
evidence that the flag’s display facilitated discrimination by
lawyers, jurors or other individuals, or that it deterred African
Americans from filing suit, serving as witnesses or jurors, or other-
wise participating in the justice system.133 Such evidence may or
may not be forthcoming. In contrast, under an expressive meaning
approach, we would ask whether reasonable onlookers would
understand the flag to be communicating a message of racial
inferiority or second-class status.134 Many continue to contest the
answer.
132. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
133. For related arguments, see Capers, supra note 8, at 163 (“Specifically, empirical data
and expert testimony should be introduced to demonstrate that minorities read and
experience the Confederate flag differently.”); Forman, supra note 58, at 515 (“The selection
of an exclusionary symbol to fly above the state capitol is harmful in part because of the
effect it may have on the desire and ability of the excluded to participate in the political and
legal processes.”); see also L. Darnell Weeden, How to Establish Flying the Confederate Flag
with the State as Sponsor Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 34 AKRON L. REV. 521, 522
(2001) (“Serena Williams, U.S. Open champion, withdrew from the Family Circle Cup tennis
tournament at Hilton Head Island to protest South Carolina’s flying of the Confederate
flag.”).
134. See Capers, supra note 8, at 164 (“In the end, the state display of the Confederate flag
itself functions as a pledge, a pledge of allegiance, to protect one class of citizens over
another, to mark an entire state and its resources as belonging, in the first instance, to one
class of citizens over another, and to preserve a hegemony that accords one class of citizens
a higher status than another.”); Forman, supra note 58, at 525 (describing the expressive
meaning of the Confederate flag to African Americans). 
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As another example, Alabama state law requires that public
schools’ sex education curriculum include “[a]n emphasis, in a
factual manner and from a public health perspective, that homosex-
uality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public.”135 Although
public schools’ curricular decisions are generally considered to be
government speech136 largely insulated from Free Speech Clause
review if schools are to function effectively,137 such speech might
violate the Equal Protection Clause under behavioral harm analysis
if the plaintiffs could show that such speech facilitated discrimina-
tion against GLBT students by other students or faculty, or if it
deterred GLBT students from participating in certain educational
or extracurricular activities. Similarly, an expressive meaning ap-
proach could also conclude that such government speech communi-
cated GLBT students’ outsider or second-class status in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
Some may wonder whether efforts to assess the expressive harm
of government’s discriminatory speech are inevitably and unaccept-
ably indeterminate, leading to inconsistent and unprincipled re-
sults.138 Indeed, many commentators criticize endorsement analysis
in the Establishment Clause context for the same reason, objecting
that the effort to characterize a governmental message as endorsing
or disapproving religion exceeds courts’ institutional competence.139 
135. ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (1975). 
136. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (suggesting that “speech
by an instructor or a professor in the academic context” constituted government speech);
Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that school’s choice of
textbooks and other curricular materials constituted government speech). 
137. See Rosemary C. Salome, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the
Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 185 (1996) (“Commentators embracing a more
comprehensive approach maintain ... that schools as unique ‘mediating structures’ linking
the young to the local community and larger society make curricular decisions that should
be upheld as long as they are rational.”).
138. To be sure, many are untroubled by indeterminacy in this context and see it as
generally unavoidable. See, e.g., HELLMAN, supra note 62, at 85 (“People are likely to
disagree about whether any actual practice demeans. No theory could, nor should, hope to
eliminate such disagreement entirely. The theory I propose helps to channel that
disagreement to the right question. Of course as a society we need mechanisms for dealing
with disagreement, whether disagreement about when discrimination is wrong or anything
else. In our society, these methods include democratic and judicial decision making.”). For
a more detailed discussion of the indeterminacy challenge in this context, see id. at 59-85.
139. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1389, 1440-41 (2000); Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other)
Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1815, 1822 (2011) (“That there are
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Although not without force, such criticisms are neither new nor
uncommon.140 Indeed, some find value in such indeterminacy,
characterizing it more positively as “minimalistic.”141 Moreover,
although the exercise of determining expressive meaning can be
challenging, it is not without parallel elsewhere. Endorsement
analysis itself assesses the perceptions of a reasonable observer
when determining whether a governmental message approves or
disapproves of a particular religion in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.142 Along the same lines, the Supreme Court’s “true
threats” doctrine considers whether contested expression would
lead a reasonable target to fear violence in determining whether the
speech is unprotected by the First Amendment and within the
government’s power to regulate.143 Perhaps most relevant for pur-
poses of this Article, statutory antidiscrimination law looks to the
things that matter very much—decisions that are very important, and that go to the heart
of our constitutional enterprise—but that are nevertheless, for the most part, best handled
politically and not through judicial review, is not an unfamiliar or novel idea.”); McConnell,
supra note 111, at 13-14; Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of
Meaning, 60 MD. L. REV. 506, 521 & n.48 (2001). 
140. See Jay D. Wexler, The Endorsement Court, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263, 282-83
(2006) (noting that “[t]he argument that the endorsement test is indeterminate, provides
little guidance for lower courts, and will inevitably result in inconsistent decisions is a strong
critique. However, this claim is hardly unique among analytical frameworks in constitutional
law, which is filled with such ‘know it when we see it’ tests,” and then offering examples of
such tests (footnote omitted)). 
141. See, e.g., id. at 283 (“The endorsement test, like these other tests, is an example of
judicial minimalism, in the sense that it necessarily results in very narrow decisions that
turn on the specific details and characteristics of the particular case being adjudicated.
Because they are minimalistic, these tests will inevitably give little guidance to lower courts
and may result in inconsistent decisions.... One of the[ ] benefits [of judicial minimalism] is
that by employing [it], the Court can take its time with particularly difficult issues (such as
the proper limits of church-state interaction) and allow the state of the law to evolve as the
Court learns more about the particular circumstances giving rise to these complicated
controversies.” (footnote omitted)).
142. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (adopting the
perspective of “an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute” in assessing its secular or sectarian purpose and effect);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asking whether a
reasonable observer would conclude that the government had communicated “a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community”).
143. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (defining a true threat as that
which a reasonable person would consider an expression of the speaker’s intent to inflict
bodily harm). 
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perceptions of a reasonable person when determining whether
harassing speech in the workplace is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the terms and conditions of employment based on protected
class status.144 To be sure, such assessments are often hotly con-
tested, but courts nevertheless have a body of experience from
which to draw.145 
2. Standing
Those who are concerned about the indeterminacy of expressive
meaning analysis are often similarly inclined toward a constraining
standing principle to protect against judicial subjectivity in areas
where they see limits on courts’ institutional competence as well as
the need to conserve judicial power.146 Indeed, one might plausibly
ask who would have injury-in-fact standing under an expressive
meaning approach to bring an equal protection challenge to
government speech.147 Similar controversies are common in the
144. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
145. In response to indeterminacy criticisms directed to endorsement analysis in the
Establishment Clause context, Jay Wexler proposes a bright line rule providing that
government speech disapproving religion violates the Establishment Clause only when it
makes express negative reference to religion or a religion. Jay Wexler, Government
Disapproval of Religion 4 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-32, 2011), available
at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1883597 (“Government messages expressing views about
social, political, scientific, or other issues that do not explicitly refer to religion but are
nonetheless offensive to religious believers are also not unconstitutional disapprovals,
because if they were, the government would be unable to function. This leaves statements,
displays, symbols, and other messages that do explicitly refer to and condemn religion as
subject to disapproval analysis, a task that will be, in many cases, as difficult and
controversial as typical endorsement analysis but equally as important to keeping the
government from taking explicit positions on religious truth or value.”). In Wexler’s view,
this offers a narrower, but more surgically precise, approach to identifying constitutionally
salient harms: “[B]y outlawing only explicit negative references to religion, the test focuses
on the government action that is most harmful to religion and most likely to make believers
feel like outsiders in the political community.” Id. 
146. Note, supra note 111, at 2012.
147. Note that this discussion of injury-in-fact standing as it arises in the Establishment
Clause context is very different from the possibility of taxpayer standing, in which a plaintiff
taxpayer seeks to challenge specific congressional appropriations alleged to establish or
endorse religion in violation of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 592-93, 610-11 (2007) (finding no taxpayer standing when
the plaintiff brought an Establishment Clause challenge to “the President’s Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives program [in which], among other things, President Bush and former
Secretary of Education Paige gave speeches that used ‘religious imagery’ and praised the
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Establishment Clause context, although the Supreme Court has yet
to confront the matter.148 Indeed, the issue has split the lower
courts: some require the plaintiffs to allege that the government’s
religious speech caused them to alter their behavior, while others
instead require the plaintiffs simply to allege direct and unwelcome
contact with the government’s religious message.149
A number of lower court decisions illustrate these tensions
especially effectively, as they wrestle with Establishment Clause
challenges to “pure” government speech in the form of proclama-
tions or resolutions that endorse or celebrate religious activity. For
example, the Seventh Circuit recently considered an Establishment
Clause challenge to President Obama’s “National Day of Prayer”
proclamation and dismissed the case for lack of standing.150 
There the majority and concurring opinion quarreled over the
nature of the injury generally required to satisfy standing for
Establishment Clause challenges. The majority required behavioral
harm to support an allegation of injury-in-fact:
efficacy of faith-based programs in delivering social services,” because taxpayer standing is
limited to exercises of congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause and thus
not available with respect to challenges of executive expenditures). 
148. Indeed, as a number of commentators have observed, the Court not infrequently
altogether fails to address standing issues in the Establishment Clause context. See, e.g.,
Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 58, at 722-23 & n.215 (describing examples of such
failures).
149. For discussion of the disarray among lower courts in determining injury-in-fact
standing for Establishment Clause purposes, see David Harvey, It’s Time to Make Non-
Economic or Citizen Standing Take a Seat in ‘Religious Display’ Cases, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 313,
315, 321-63 (2002) (describing the split in circuits); Marc Rohr, Tilting at Crosses:
Nontaxpayer Standing to Sue Under the Establishment Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495,
501-04 (1995) (noting how the Supreme Court has failed even to discuss standing in many
of its Establishment Clause cases); David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? Nontaxpayer
Standing to Challenge Religious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 1075 (2011)
(describing “[t]wo basic tests” among the courts of appeals: “The dominant approach requires
a plaintiff to show some version of direct and unwelcome contact with the challenged symbol
or display. A second approach requires a plaintiff to show that he altered his behavior to
avoid contact with the allegedly offensive display.” (footnote omitted)); Note, supra note 111,
at 2003-05 (describing the two tests).
150. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“Plaintiffs contend that they are injured because they feel excluded, or made unwelcome,
when the President asks them to engage in a religious observance that is contrary to their
own principles. It is difficult to see how any reader of the 2010 proclamation would feel
excluded or unwelcome.... Still, hurt feelings differ from legal injury.”).
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Eventually we may need to revisit the subject of observers’
standing in order to reconcile this circuit’s decisions, but today
is not the time.... What did provide standing [in a previous case],
we held, is that the plaintiffs had altered their daily commute,
thus incurring costs in both time and money, to avoid the
unwelcome religious display.
... Plaintiffs have not altered their conduct one whit or
incurred any cost in time or money. All they have is disagree-
ment with the President’s action. But unless all limits on
standing are to be abandoned, a feeling of alienation cannot
suffice as injury in fact.151
 
In contrast, concurring Judge Williams urged “a direct and un-
welcome exposure” standard that seems to recognize cognizable
injuries as including expressive wrongs: 
Nor, as the majority suggests, must the plaintiffs alter their
behavior in order to have a cognizable injury.... We stated [in a
previous case] that a plaintiff can also satisfy the standing
requirement by establishing that he is subject to direct and
unwelcome exposure to religious messages.... 
....
The rule in every other circuit that has considered the
question is that while an allegation of a change in behavior is
sufficient to confer standing, it is not required.152
In many ways, these divisions repeat those over whether
behavioral change or expressive harm is required to violate the
Establishment Clause itself153—and are driven by similar concerns
over the limits of courts’ institutional competence, the dangers of
unprincipled subjectivity, and the need to conserve judicial
151. Id. at 807-08.
152. Id. at 810-11 (Williams, J., concurring); see also Ariz. Civil Liberties Union v.
Dunham, 112 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (D. Ariz. 2000) (finding injury-in-fact standing for a
plaintiff challenging town’s proclamation of “Bible Week”: “That the Proclamation is
announced rather than displayed does not preclude unwelcome direct contact with the
Proclamation via news reports. A reported Proclamation can be more invasive than a visual
display due to the pervasiveness of media coverage. To avoid the Proclamation, Plaintiffs
would be faced not with the option of merely altering a travel route. Rather, they would need
to avoid the media entirely, an option close to impossible in this age. Moreover, no such
avoidance is required.”). 
153. See supra Part III.B.
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resources.154 Neither standing standard, however, would prove
insuperable in the Equal Protection context155: most potential
plaintiffs could show direct and unwelcome contact with the
government’s message,156 and some could show that the govern-
ment’s message altered their behavior.157 
3. Unintended Consequences
Consider yet another set of objections. Skeptics might well argue
that interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit some
government speech might thwart or deter government’s laudable
expressive efforts to shape norms about race, gender, national
origin, sexual orientation, or another class status.158 Indeed, gov-
ernment speech that makes reference to class status often seeks to
promote equal protection values.159 For example, a state’s decision
to teach African American, Latino, or GLBT history in the public
schools160 seeks to counter, rather than reinforce, historical patterns
of hierarchy based on protected class status. Just as government
might exercise its expressive choices in ways that reinforce dis-
154. Cf. Spencer, supra note 149, at 1088-89 (“There is at least an intuitive tension
between a rule of standing that bars all claims based solely on stigmatic injury and a
substantive constitutional guarantee that, according to several Supreme Court decisions, is
aimed at protecting individuals from the stigma caused by certain governmental messages.”).
155. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 41, 43 (“[O]ne can accept a very broad conception of
standing in areas of constitutional law where the injury is expressive. This appears to be the
‘solution’ adopted by the Court in some Establishment Clause cases.... [P]erhaps we ought
not worry so much about standing after all. In most Equal Protection cases, standing will
stand alone because the state action will not affect all equally. In those rare instances where
the state action does affect all equally, a commitment to the right understanding of the
constitutional guarantee must make us accept the inconvenience of a broad standing
requirement.”). 
156. See supra Part IV.B.
157. See supra Part IV.A.
158. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2025 (1996) (“[L]egal ‘statements’ might be designed to change social norms. I catalogue a
range of possible (and in my view legitimate) efforts to alter norms through legal expressions
about appropriate evaluative attitudes. I also argue that the expressive function of law
makes most sense in connection with efforts to change norms.”). 
159. See Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1115, 1120-22, 1187-88 (2010) (extolling the benefits of government speech that challenges
or counters hate speech by private speakers). 
160. See, e.g., Ian Lovett, California to Require Gay History in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2011, at A16. 
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crimination, so too might it use its voice to combat racism and other
forms of bias. Would such government speech be understood to
violate the Equal Protection Clause under either behavioral or
expressive harm analysis?
Behavioral harm analysis would require a showing that such
speech facilitated private parties’ discrimination against whites or
heterosexuals, or discouraged them from engaging in certain
activity. As discussed above, such a causal showing is difficult to
make in any event,161 and appears especially unlikely in these
cases. Indeed, longstanding experience with antidiscrimination law
shows the difficulty of persuading judges that any speech rises to
the level of regulable discriminatory conduct.162 
Moreover, just as Title VII treats workplace speech that refer-
ences protected class status to extol the benefits of diversity—or for
other nonsubordinating reasons—very differently from workplace
speech advocating the exclusion of women or people of color,163 so
too would be the case with respect to government speech under
expressive meaning theory. An expressive meaning approach would
focus on whether the government message communicates outsider
or second-class status based on protected class status; to be sure,
expressing concern for some does not necessarily include, much less
require, disregard or denigration of another.164 For this reason,
government’s expressive support for gay and lesbian rights or for
161. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
162. Many will doubt courts’ ability or willingness to find the requisite behavioral harm
given plaintiffs’ often unsuccessful experience under Title VII. See, e.g., Ann Juliano &
Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 568
(2001) (documenting high rate of dismissals and summary judgment rulings against
harassment plaintiffs under Title VII); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The
Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 791, 794-95 (2002); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and
Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 313-16 (1999) (describing
courts’ reluctance to find for harassment plaintiffs).
163. Cf. HELLMAN, supra note 62, at 85 (“People are likely to disagree about whether any
actual practice demeans. No theory could, nor should, hope to eliminate such disagreement
entirely. The theory I propose helps to channel that disagreement to the right question. Of
course as a society we need mechanisms for dealing with disagreement, whether
disagreement about when discrimination is wrong or anything else. In our society, these
methods include democratic and judicial decision making.”). 
164. As Jeffery Helmreich explains, treating race or any other class status as relevant is
not the same as treating it as inferior or demeaned. See Helmreich, supra note 34, at 125
(“[R]ace-consciousness by itself is not obviously subordinating.”).
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affirmative action can certainly be framed in ways that do not
demean others based on class status.165 Along these lines, govern-
ment may criticize certain behavior—such as hate speech or hate
crimes—without denigrating the class status of specific individuals
who engaged in that behavior.166 In short, government messages
that seek to undermine traditional patterns of hierarchy would not
frustrate an antisubordination understanding of equal protection
values;167 on the other hand, a governmental message that in fact
disparaged whites’ racial identity or straight people’s sexual
orientation would, and should, lead to a very different result under
expressive meaning analysis.
Finally, perhaps some might also argue that recognizing equal
protection challenges to government’s hateful speech will have
further unintended, and damaging, consequences. More specifically,
some might suggest that providing a constitutional remedy for
165. See Wexler, supra note 145, at 12 (“Praise of one religion for doing something good
for society (I’m not talking here about the truth or inherent value of the religious tradition)
does not send a message to other religions and nonreligious people that they are disfavored,
unless perhaps those other people and groups have done something obviously exactly the
same as the praised group but have not received the same governmental support.”). The
same should be true of government speech for or against affirmative action, or addressing
some political controversy involving race or immigration, so long as government is not
expressing hatred of class members based on race, national origin, et cetera. Indeed, critics
may object that either or both behavioral and expressive harm analysis offer little
meaningful redress for government’s hateful speech because few plaintiffs will ever satisfy
the requisite tests. I agree that these tests will be hard to satisfy—but, generally, they should
be to prevent chilling government discussion of difficult topics. 
166. This invites the question whether an expressive meaning approach to equal
protection analysis would preclude government from criticizing gay or lesbian sexual
conduct. While race and many other class characteristics are of course not inextricably linked
to certain behavior, much less orientation, this distinction is not meaningful in the sexual
orientation context, where orientation is the basis for defining and protecting the class. In
other words, it is possible to express hostility towards a specific position or course of conduct
regardless of the actor’s religion or nonreligion, race, gender, national origin, et cetera, but
it is not possible to express hostility towards gay and lesbian orientation without expressing
hostility based on that class status. The Supreme Court remains divided as to whether such
hostility violates the Constitution. Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)
(striking down a governmental classification on the basis of sexual orientation as
“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests”), with id. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the government as instead engaging in a “reasonable effort to preserve
traditional moral values”).
167. As Deborah Hellman observes, such classes often turn on whether “that characteristic
has been used to separate people in the past and the relative social status of the group
defined by the characteristic today.” HELLMAN, supra note 62, at 28.
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government’s transparent expression of bigotry may simply drive
such speech underground in ways that make political mobilization
in opposition more difficult. At times this may be true. On the other
hand, the cognitive effort required by government speakers who
must then express bigotry in more veiled ways may be valuable in
and of itself, further entrenching the Constitution’s commitment to
equality. Consider, for example, the experience under Establish-
ment Clause doctrine: expressive meaning theory finds value in
forcing government actors to think hard before engaging in speech
that assumes religious adherence as a condition of insider status.168
The same should be true for government actors contemplating the
delivery of a message that communicates outsider status on the
basis of other class status.
CONCLUSION
Private parties’ hateful speech generally remains protected from
government regulation by the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause.169 Whether government speech that expresses such animus
on the basis of class status runs afoul of the Constitution, however,
is an entirely different question. Not only does the government
possess no First Amendment rights of its own,170 but its racist or
otherwise hateful speech can inflict a range of behavioral and
168. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
169. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392, 395-96 (1992) (striking down, on
First Amendment grounds, a city ordinance that regulated private actors’ bias-motivated or
hateful speech); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (holding that the First
Amendment protects a private party’s “hurtful” speech at a funeral protest); Schauer, supra
note 46, at 90 (“As a case about the First Amendment and harm, Snyder represents a clear
statement, among the clearest the Court has ever issued, about the extent to which the First
Amendment protects even personally harmful speech.”). 
170. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139-41 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.”); YUDOF, supra note 1,
at 42-50 (arguing that government does not possess First Amendment free speech rights);
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377, 1501-08 (2001) (arguing that, because the First Amendment is drafted as a
constraint on government action, recognizing government’s own First Amendment rights is
inconsistent with constitutional text and purpose). This leaves legislatures free to enact laws
limiting government speech—and they often do so. See Norton, Campaign Speech Law, supra
note 7, at 259-61 (describing federal and state statutes that constrain government speech in
various contexts).
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expressive harms repugnant to equality values.171 Contemporary
equal protection doctrine, however, does not yet fully address the
potential harms of such government speech. 
The recent emergence of the Court’s government speech doctrine
—which to date has emphasized the value of government expression
without yet fully addressing its potential costs—offers an important
new opportunity to consider the situations in which government
expression might violate the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing,
we might draw from our experience in assessing the potential
Establishment Clause implications of government’s religious
speech. First, under a behavioral harm approach, we might under-
stand the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit government’s hateful
expression when it would facilitate private parties’ discrimination
or cause a reasonable target to alter her behavior172—for example,
by discouraging class members from pursuing a government job or
petitioning the legislature because they reasonably conclude that
such efforts would be pointless or unwise.173 Second, under an
expressive meaning analysis, we might understand the Equal
Protection Clause to prohibit government speech that communi-
cates that class members are outsiders or second-class citizens.174
This Article concludes that both behavioral harm and expressive
meaning analyses more completely recognize the array of harms
potentially posed by government speech that expresses hatred,
hostility, or animus on the basis of class status than does the status
quo, which largely ignores such harms. In exploring these frame-
works, I neither pretend that they will suddenly make hard cases
easy, nor do I mean to suggest that they are the only, or necessarily
the best, approaches for addressing these issues. My concern in-
stead is that, to date, we lack an equal protection framework for
assessing what should be even relatively straightforward cases. I
thus see value in recognizing that, at least under some circum-
stances, government may deny individuals the equal protection of
the laws when its expression intentionally classifies individuals as
worthy or not worthy of respect based on their class status. 
171. See supra Part II.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
